BYKO
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EP 58

A Base Co-Founder's Account Became a Scam Token's Source

A verified social source can be authentic while the token post it publishes is not—how quickly does crypto infrastructure notice the reversal?

Jesse Pollak's post about unauthorized scam token tickers published through a connected third-party app

Jesse Pollak said an attacker used a third-party app connected to his X account to post scam token tickers. He deleted the posts, removed all app connections and regained control.

The relevant failure is not in an ERC-20 contract. It is in provenance: a widely trusted social account temporarily made an untrusted ticker look official.

For BYKO, this creates a measurable test. After the same source disavows a token, how quickly do wallets, explorers, DEX interfaces and risk providers remove inherited legitimacy, add warnings, or keep the asset tradable? A contract address can identify code. It cannot prove that the person apparently publishing it intended to do so.

Sources: Jesse Pollak, TokenPost, ChainCatcher/KuCoin.

Figures corrected after publication stay on the page: the old number is struck, not deleted, and the entry that fixed it is dated.

InstrumentBYKO — legitimacy meter Serial790,227 NetworkBase · 8453 Rev1.3 Statusin service · running

Neighbouring entries

Either side of this one

7 September 2026

L-BTC Lost 95% of Its Reserve. Supply Stayed Put

L-BTC's supply survived the incident unchanged while its reserve covered only about five cents of Bitcoin per token at the cutoff.

 newer 5 September 2026

AMC Rejected the Token Bearing Its Ticker. Robinhood Refused to Stop It

Robinhood can prove which AMC token is canonical; AMC can still say the product has nothing to do with the company.

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